

Chief, Economic Division, R/EE

16 July 1949

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Wright Field Trip

1. The following is a report of our Wright Field trip (11 July to 14 July) for the purpose of investigating the function and operation of those divisions of the Air Materiel Command concerned with the production of economic intelligence. Particular attention was directed toward the possibilities for establishment of a basis for working level coordination and acquisition of a background for programming production.

2. Function of the Materials and Industry Units

Within the Air Materiel Command, the groups primarily concerned with production of economic intelligence on the Soviet orbit are the Materials and Industry Units of the Analysis Division. They are charged with the responsibility for reporting foreign (largely USSR and Satellite) research and development efforts as they apply to the aircraft industry. In the fulfillment of the above function, these units analyze production methods, processes and techniques in order to determine qualitative limitations on quantitative data. In addition, it has been necessary for these units to do basic work on the Soviet orbit for quantitative as well as qualitative reports. Their canvass of the field revealed, as it has to R/EE in CIA, a dearth of useful basic studies.

3. Organization

The position of the Materials and Industry Units in the field of Air Intelligence is shown in rough outline on the attached chart.

M and I's fields of study in which R/EE has a direct interest include primarily: abrasives, machine tools, ball bearings, ferro-alloys, non-ferrous metals, rubber, chemicals, technical manpower, and underground installations. (See Appendix A.) Also of concern to R/EE is the work of the Fuels and Lubrication Unit and the Civil Transport Unit in the Aircraft Analysis Section and the Special Section.


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4. Operation

By the very nature of their basic function, the analyses and reports of the M and I Units are slanted toward air intelligence requirements. To satisfactorily perform this function, they must do basic economic research in selected fields which are of critical importance

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to the aircraft industry. The lists of their completed projects and projects in process reflect this very clearly. (See Appendix B.)

It is in this area that M and I can contribute to economic intelligence for R/EZ. It is understood that these units would be receptive to requests for study which would parallel their own interests. OSI (CIA) has already established a precedent for this type of arrangement.

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
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6. Potential Contribution to B/EE

The aforementioned units of the SEC can provide a substantial increment to the economic intelligence effort of B/EE through the following contributions:

a. Information on request utilizing AMC sources and specialists not directly available to B/EE.

b. Finished reports - valuable both for the material itself and as a partial basis for generalization in certain fields (e.g. production engineering, metallurgy, chemicals, and skilled manpower).

c. Full coverage of certain fields in which B/EE has an interest (e.g. underground installations).

d. On request, act in an advisory capacity to Ad Hoc Committees sponsored by B/EE.

e. Translation of technical papers in which there is a parallel interest.

f. On request, furnish finished studies (qualitative and quantitative) in those technical fields in which there is a parallel interest (e.g. refractories, sintered carbide, synthetic rubber tires, titanium).

g. Review and development of B/EE papers pertaining to AMC field of interest (e.g. abrasives, machine tools, chemicals).

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**7. Recommendations**

a. That the potentialities noted above be exploited through OGB liaison with A-2 and through working level coordination. This should be preceded by joint planning for allocation of projects, spheres of study, etc.

b. That members of the Economic Division concerned with the previously noted activities of AMC be sent to contact their opposite numbers to determine potentialities for exploitation.

c. That an investigation similar to this be conducted with:

- (1) [REDACTED]  
(2) Signal Corps  
(3) Ordnance  
(4) BuShips  
(5) and other government agencies in which certain divisions may be engaged in technical studies concerning the Soviet orbit.

Such a review is a prerequisite to any R/IE program involving planning of requirements and allocation of projects.

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**APPENDIX B**

**COMPLETED PROJECTS**

1. The German 30,000 Ton Light Metals Forge Press in Sverdlovsk.
2. An Analysis of Foreign Efforts to Eliminate Critical Materials in Turbine Blades.
3. Staff Study on V-2 - German.
4. Estimates of Bill of Materials and Production Man Hours Required to Produce 20,000 A-4's, V-2, etc. "A Chart for RDB" - US.
5. Soviet Capabilities to Produce the "Tiafum".
6. Industry Defense Study (Distribution limited to Air Force) - Foreign, exclusive of USSR.
7. Soviet Materials and Industrial Capacity.
- 25X6A 8. [REDACTED]
9. Normal Trends Report Contributions and Air Intelligence Digest "Tech Briefs". Rubber, metals, etc.
10. Expensibility of the Soviet Airframe Industry.

**PROJECTS IN PROCESS**

- 25X6A 1. [REDACTED]
2. Ceramic Status of the USSR. (June 1950)
3. Hydroxine Hydrate Technology. (January 1950)
4. Rubber (Technical)
- 25X1A [REDACTED]
7. Underground Activities. (Continuous)
8. Ball Bearings. (Soviet)
9. Machine Tool. (Soviet)


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10. Engines. (Soviet)
11. Soviet "Hane" Production. 
12. Kayon 22 Production Analysis.
13. Soviet Airframe Production Analysis.
14. Industrial Planning Efforts of Foreign Powers.

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APPENDIX C — TRANSLATION FACILITIES

Translation of Soviet periodicals and technical books of great value to CIA, has been undertaken by the AMC intelligence department.

This is done by: (1) a pool of technical translators numbering approximately 25 persons; and (2) three commercial service companies. The former is the only body of industrially qualified translators within the IAC agencies that we know of. Since much of the material translated is basic to CIE, R/EE, Economic Division interests, it is suggested that closer liaison be inaugurated both for (1) programming translation work and exchange of translated work; and (2) CIA to provide AMC with some of the technical publications in Russian available in CIA which, due to the excessive work load in FDB, have not been translated. Such publications of parallel interest could be more readily farmed out to AMC for translation. Issues of STANKI I INSTRUMENT, in particular, could be arranged for on a regular screening and translating schedule. This periodical deals with a field in which CIA and AMC have parallel interests.

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**APPENDIX 2**

**INFORMATION PERTINENT**

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The Analysis Division maintains very close liaison with individual manufacturers [REDACTED] in order (1) to keep informed on domestic methods and production problems related to aircraft production for purposes of comparison with foreign (primarily Soviet) developments; and (2) to solicit domestic specialist evaluation of foreign (primarily Soviet) technical intelligence data.

The analysts make field trips to domestic manufacturers supposedly after AMC has arranged coordination [REDACTED] No substantive reports are forwarded to CIA as a result of these trips. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] AMC technical specialists desire better working coordination [REDACTED] with CIE analysts on such projects. CIE specialists should have substantive reports resulting from AMC field trips, and AMC should be furnished with more technical material procured by CIA [REDACTED]

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